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This article analyses the judgement delivered by the European Court of Justice on 13 September
2005 establishing that the European Community has the power to require the Member States
to impose criminal penalties for the purpose of protecting the environment, and discusses its
benefits in the light of the need to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of other
Community policies and the freedom of movement of persons, goods, services and capital. In
particular, the consequences of the judgement for acts adopted and proposals pending will be
considered. Attention is also paid to the costs for national sovereignty and to relevant changes
introduced in the Constitutional Treaty.
By José F. Castillo García, Lecturer – European Centre for Judges and Lawyers,
EIPA-Antenna Luxembourg*
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Introduction
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) gave a crucial judgement
on 13 September 20051 finally putting an end to a dispute
between the European Commission and the Council of the
European Union (EU) on the legality of the Framework
Decision (FD) on the protection of the environment through
criminal law2 adopted in the framework of the third pillar
(title VI of the EU Treaty).3
The Commission argued that the European Community
(EC) can, under Article 175 EC, require the Member States
to prescribe criminal sanctions for infringements of
Community environmental protection legislation, consi-
dering that it is a necessary means of ensuring the effecti-
veness of this Community policy.4 The Council, however,
maintained that “the Community does not have power to
require the Member States to impose criminal penalties in
respect of the conduct covered by the FD, as there is no
express conferral of power in that regard”.5 The ECJ,
considering that it could have been properly adopted on
the basis of Article 175 EC, decided to annul the FD.
As Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer explains in
his opinion,6 what lies behind this dispute is a far-reaching
issue, as the choice of one position or the other entails
completely different legal and institutional consequences.
The fact that the EC could have the power to approximate
national criminal laws, not only in the field of environmental
crime – as the ECJ has ruled – but also in the framework of
other policy areas of the Community, would ipso facto
imply the application of the Community method to the
detriment of the intergovernmental rules foreseen in Title VI
EU.7 This is precisely what most of the Member States that
have fiercely guarded their sovereignty over criminal law
fear.8
The issue at stake is not new. Discussions on the competence
of the Community to force Member States to impose
criminal sanctions have been taking place for a long time,
as criminal law has been associated with the implementation
of the internal market and related Community policies.9
However, even if some Community instruments have
included provisions on criminal sanctions, the freedom of
the Member States to choose between administrative or
criminal law was never called into question.10
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and,
more recently, the Treaty of Amsterdam that expressly
provides for the approximation of rules on criminal matters11
and introduces the FD as a legal instrument to achieve this
aim,12  “the question of whether or not the Community was
entitled to harmonise national criminal laws did not become
less relevant”.13 Indeed, the activity of both the EU and the
EC on approximation of criminal law has increased in the
last few years14 and conflicts of competence between the
first and third pillars could not be avoided. The case of
environmental crime has given to the ECJ for the first time
the opportunity to determine the boundaries between both
pillars with respect to the harmonisation of criminal law.
The legal and institutional constraints of
the EU Treaty
In order to understand what lies behind the dispute, it is
important to highlight the reasons why the Commission
submitted a proposal for a Community Directive15 intended
to oblige the Member States to provide for criminal sanctions
in the environmental field, rather than a proposal for a FD
– as Denmark actually did.16 The difficulties that arise from
the current legal and institutional framework of the EU
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Treaty – described in the assessment of the Tampere
programme17 – are at the core of the problem. Wasmeier
and Thwaites identify three different categories of problem.18
First, as regards the legislative procedure, Framework
Decisions are to be proposed either by a Member State or
by the Commission and adopted unanimously by the
Council after having consulted the European Parliament.19
Directives, however, can only be proposed by the
Commission and, in most cases, are adopted by qualified
majority following the co-decision procedure. The shared
right of initiative between the Commission and the Member
States in the framework of the third pillar, the unanimity
requirement and the current restrictions on the Parliament’s
role are widely seen as negatively affecting the Union’s
ability to act in this sphere.20
Second, “the legal effect of third pillar instruments
differs from that of Community law instruments”. According
to Article 34(2)(b) EU, Framework Decisions “shall be
binding upon the Member States as to the result to be
achieved, but they shall not entail direct effect”.21 This
means that citizens can in no circumstances take legal
action if a Member State fails to transpose the act. In the
context of the first pillar, on the other hand, there is no doubt
that Community Directives can have direct effect, as the ECJ
has held through its constant jurisprudence.22
Third, once the instruments are adopted, “the institutional
limits regarding the real possibilities for verifying the
implementation of policies by national authorities, given
the limited role of the Court of Justice and the restricted
powers of the Commission are a real obstacle to ensuring
that the instruments and decisions adopted are actually
effective”.23 As stated in Article 35(2) and (3) EU, the
jurisdiction of the ECJ to give preliminary rulings depends
on a declaration of each Member State.24 According to Art.
35(6), the Court can now review the legality of Framework
Decisions and Decisions.25 However, as Wasmeier points
out, “the impact of these actions is limited, as the Commission
cannot ask for a ruling on the Member States’ implemen-
tation of Framework Decisions and Decisions, or for sanctions
in cases of non-compliance”. In other words, “a major
weakness for enforcement of EU law is that there is no
infringement procedure as in the first pillar”.26
This last difficulty was also stressed by the Commission
in the action brought on 15 April 2003 against the Council,27
based on Article 35(6) EU, in which it stated that “the choice
of the legal basis is important in this case because of the
special institutional features of Title VI EU which, inter alia,
does not have any equivalent to the infringement procedure”.
Background
The FD on the protection of the environment through
criminal law was formally adopted by the Council on 27
January 2003 on the basis of an initiative presented by
Denmark.28 As the ECJ clearly states in paragraph 3 of its
judgement, the FD, based on Articles 29, 31(e) and
34(2)(b) EU, “constitutes the instrument by which the EU
intends to respond with concerted action to the disturbing
increase in offences posing a threat to the environment”. In
Articles 2 and 3, it lays down a number of environmental
offences, in respect of which the Member States are
required to prescribe criminal penalties.29 Article 5 provides
that the penalties must be “effective, proportionate and
dissuasive”, including, “at least in serious cases, penalties
involving deprivation of liberty which can give rise to
extradition”.
The Commission was supported in its action by the
European Parliament, which on 9 April 2002 expressed its
view on both the proposed Directive and on the draft
Framework Decision.30 As established in paragraph 13 of
the judgement, Parliament called on the Council “(i) to use
the FD as a measure complementing the Directive that
would take effect in relation to the protection of the
environment through criminal law solely in respect of
judicial cooperation and (ii) to refrain from adopting the FD
before adoption of the proposed directive”.
The Council, considering that the proposal for a Directive
did not reach the majority required for its adoption and that
it went beyond the powers attributed to the Community by
the EC Treaty, decided to adopt the FD on the basis of Title
VI EU.31
The Commission appended the statement cited below
to the minutes of the Council meeting at which the FD was
adopted.32
Legal arguments of the parties
As already cited above, the Commission, although it does
not claim that the European Community has a general
competence in criminal matters, submits that “the
Community legislature is competent, under Article 175 EC,
to require the Member States to prescribe criminal penalties
for infringements of Community environmental-protection
legislation if it takes the view that that is a necessary means
of ensuring that the legislation is effective. The harmonisation
of national criminal laws, in particular of the constituent
elements of environmental offences to which criminal
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penalties attach, is designed to be an aid to the Community
policy in question”.33 It is clear that criminal law is not to be
considered as a Community policy, but just as a means to
ensure the effectiveness of the environmental policy.
The Commission relies, in support of its argument, on
the case law of the Court concerning the duty of loyal
cooperation and the principles of effectiveness and
equivalence, as well as on two Community Directives which
require the Member States to introduce penalties which are
necessarily criminal in nature, although that qualification
has not been expressly employed.34 That is the case of
Article 14 of Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June
1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the
purpose of money laundering and also of Articles 1 to 3 of
Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002
defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and
residence.
Finally, the Commission also puts forward a ground of
challenge alleging abuse of process (paragraph 24 of the
judgement). “Recitals 5 and 7 in the preamble to the FD
show that the choice of an instrument under Title VI EU was
based on considerations of expediency, since the proposed
directive had failed to obtain the majority required for its
adoption because a majority of Member States had refused
to recognise that the Community had the necessary powers
to require the Member States to prescribe criminal penalties
for environmental offences”.
The Council, supported by 11 Member States, argues
that the Community does not have the power mentioned.
Paragraph 27 states that “not only is there no express
conferral of power in that regard, but, given the considerable
significance of criminal law for the sovereignty of the
Member States, there are no grounds for accepting that this
power can have been implicitly transferred to the Community
at the time when specific substantive competences, such as
those exercised under Article 175 EC, were conferred on it”.
The Council therefore
concludes that, given the
absence of an explicit pro-
vision on criminal law, the
parties to the EC Treaty
did not envisage harmoni-
sation measures regard-
ing criminal matters.
It is also argued that
the Court has never obli-
ged the Member States to
adopt criminal penalties,
that legislative practice
also follows that interpre-
tation35 and that whenever
the Commission has pro-
posed to the Council that a Community measure having
implications for criminal matters be adopted, the Council
has detached the criminal part of that measure so that it
may be dealt with in a FD36 (see paragraphs 31 to 33).
The position of most of the Member States, with the
exception of The Netherlands, mainly follows the arguments
of the Council.37 For example, Denmark considers that
Articles 135 EC and 280 EC, which expressly reserve to the
Member States the application of national criminal law and
the administration of justice, confirm the interpretation of
the Council. Germany adds that the establishment of the
third pillar, with competence for judicial cooperation in
criminal matters (see Articles 29 EU, 31 EU and 34 EU), was
a consequence of the absence of a Community competence
in this field.38 According to the French Government, the EC
can only act within the limits of the powers conferred upon
it by the EC Treaty (Art. 5 EC) and, as no EC provision
expressly confers competence to the Community in the field
of criminal law, it has to be concluded that the EC cannot
oblige the Member States to provide for criminal sanctions.
The UK considers that Articles 174 EC and 175 EC do not
confer any power to the EC to legislate in the field of
criminal law.
The position of The Netherlands is quite interesting as it
acknowledges that the Community may require the Member
States to provide for criminal sanctions, provided that the
penalty is inseparably linked to the relevant substantive
Community provisions and that it can actually be shown
that imposing penalties under criminal law in that way is
necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty
in the area concerned.39 In this case the Dutch Government
considers that the penalties foreseen are not inseparably
linked to the environmental provisions of the EC and
therefore it concludes that the harmonisation of criminal
law in this field can only be operated from the third pillar.
The EC Treaty priority
The Commission, considering that the EC is competent to
impose on the Member States the obligation to provide for
criminal penalties in the environmental field, also bases its
action on the primacy of Community law.
According to Articles 47 and 29 EU,40 the EU institutions
are not free to choose between a first or a third pillar
instrument, as it is established that the EC Treaty has priority
over the EU Treaty. Therefore, an instrument under Title VI
EU can only be adopted so long as it does not affect any
Community competence.41
It also needs to be kept in mind that “Article 47 EU not
only refers to conflicts of
existing provisions, but
also to competencies as
such. In this vein, a third
pillar act extending to an
area in the Community’s
competence would violate
Art. 47 EU even if its con-
tents did not contradict
any Community law provi-
sion.”42 In the judgement
of the ECJ on airport
transit visas,43 it was made
clear that third pillar
instruments cannot tres-
pass into the area of
Community competence and that they can be declared
void in an action for annulment.
The judgement of the ECJ and its consequences
Much to the regret of the Council and the considerable
number of Member States that submitted written
observations, the Court ruled in the Commission’s favour.
Taking into account the aim and the content of the FD, the
ECJ found that although “as a general rule, neither criminal
law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within the
Community’s competence”, “the EC, when the application
of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties
The ECJ found that the
EC has the power to
require the Member States
to impose criminal
penalties for the purpose
of protecting the
environment.
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by the competent national authorities is an essential measure
for combating serious environmental offences, can take
measures which relate to the criminal law of the Member
States which it considers necessary in order to ensure that
the rules which it lays down on environmental protection
are fully effective” (paragraphs 47 and 48).
It follows that “Articles 1 to 7 of the FD, having as its main
purpose the protection of the environment, could have
been properly adopted on the basis of Article 175 EC”
(paragraph 51). “In those circumstances, the entire frame-
work decision, being indivisible, infringes Article 47 EU as
it encroaches on the powers which Article 175 EC confers
on the Community”
(paragraph 53).
It is interesting to note
that the ECJ went further
than the proposals of
Advocate-General Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer.44 In his
opinion he proposed to
annul Articles 1 to 4,
Article 5(1) – with the
exception of the reference
to sanctions involving the
deprivation of liberty and extradition –, Article 6 and Article
7(1) of the FD.45 The ECJ decided to annul the whole FD and
more specifically it considered that Articles 1 to 7, dealing
with the definition of offences, the principle of the obligation
to impose criminal sanctions, the rules on participation and
instigation, the level of penalties, accompanying penalties
and the specific rules on the liability of legal persons, could
have been properly based on Article 175 EC.46
In order to explain the conclusions to be drawn from this
judgement, the Commission adopted a communication on
its implications on 24 November 2005.47 It includes a list
of the instruments affected by the implications of the
judgement and suggests a method to correct the situation
with regards to texts which were not adopted on the proper
legal basis.
One of the main conclusions, according to the
Commission, is that the judgement “lays down principles
going far beyond the case in question. The same arguments
can be applied in their entirety to the other common policies
and to the four freedoms (freedom of movement of persons,
goods, services and capital)”.48
It is clear, in any case, that criminal law is not a
Community policy and that it can only be used as a means
in order to ensure the full effectiveness of a Community
policy or the proper functioning of a freedom. In this vein,
“the Court’s reasoning can therefore be applied to all
Community policies and freedoms which involve binding
legislation with which criminal penalties should be associated
in order to ensure their effectiveness”.49 On a case by case
basis, depending on necessity, the Commission will
determine the degree of Community involvement in the
criminal field when submitting its proposals.
The clarification by the Court judgement of the distribution
of powers between the first and third pillar entails therefore
that the provisions of criminal law required for the effective
implementation of Community law are a matter for the TEC
and those on the harmonisation of criminal law not linked
to the implementation of Community policies or fundamental
freedoms, fall within Title VI of the TEU.50
The consequences of the judgement are of crucial
importance for the Member States. Most Community policies
are implemented following the co-decision procedure and
decisions are taken by qualified majority. In this respect, one
can understand why 11 Member States have so strongly
opposed the position of the Commission and the European
Parliament in this case. A Member State that would oppose
the adoption of a directive aimed at the harmonisation of a
certain criminal offence – linked to the need for ensuring the
proper functioning of a Community policy – would still have
to introduce it into its internal legislation if a sufficient number
of Member States voted for it.
Some analysts and politicians consider that as a
consequence of the ECJ’s ruling, for the first time in legal
history, a Member State
government will no longer
have the sovereign right
to decide what constitutes
a crime and what the
punishment should be.51
This analysis can only be
understood by taking into
account the loss of the
Member States’ power to
block a decision taken by
other Member States to
impose criminal sanctions on certain offences. It should be
noted in this respect that the unanimity requirement – that
still applies in the framework of the third pillar – is not
necessarily a democratic method. In a national context, as
H. Nilsson points out, “there is no parliament that adopts
criminal law by unanimity among members of parliament
or requires unanimity among political parties”.52 Further-
more, “living under the tyranny of unanimity” has proved
to be inefficient and, especially in instruments seeking to
approximate criminal law, no real progress can be made.
In the case at hand, the proposal for a Community
Directive from the Commission will have to be considered
again and the Council and the Parliament will be entitled
to adopt it following the co-decision procedure (according
to Article 175 EC) and by qualified majority. An eventual
reluctance by Member States to assume the new legal
regime could only be understood as a rejection of the
“Community method” in this field. As already stressed,
even those Member States voting against the adoption of
the directive could be forced to implement it in their
national law if a sufficient number of Member States voted
for it. In this respect, the Commission could decide to
initiate infringement procedures against those Member
States that did not comply with Community legislation and
the ECJ could eventually declare non-compliance by certain
Member States with the Community Directive, and even
impose on them a lump sum or penalty payment, according
to Article 228 EC.
The powers of the Commission are not, in any case,
unlimited. Every time the Commission decides to propose
legislation in the Community framework, checks will have
to be carried out in order to establish the necessity of the
action to be taken and the observance of the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality. Any use of measures of
criminal law must be justified by the need to make the
Community policy in question effective.53
Concerning the consequences of the judgement for acts
adopted and proposals pending, the Commission has
already adopted its position in the Communication
mentioned above. It is considered that seven framework
decisions adopted, apart from the one that has been
The benefits from
the new judgement
can be qualified
as colossal.
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annulled, have been taken on erroneous legal bases.54 In
order to restore legality as soon as possible, the Commission
proposes that an agreement should be reached by the
three institutions (Commission, EP and Council) on
introducing a simple and speedy procedure for the adoption
of directives or other Community legislative measures to
replace those framework decisions. If this approach is
followed, “the Commission’s proposals would not contain
any provisions which differed in substance from those of the
acts adopted, even where the Commission felt that these
acts were not satisfactory”.55
The only case where the Commission already had the
possibility to introduce an action for annulment regards the
Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA of 12 July
2005 to strengthen the criminal law framework for the
enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution. The
action was brought on 23 November 2005 and it should be
noted that the Commission has already announced that the
action will be withdrawn once the proposal aiming at
correcting the legal basis for the framework decision in
question is adopted.
For pending proposals, the Commission will make the
necessary changes and they will follow the full decision-
making procedure applicable to their legal basis.56
The Constitutional Treaty57 and the harmonisation
of criminal law
The entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty, in its
current form, would be crucial for the completion of the
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. One has to
acknowledge, however, that its future is now very much in
doubt, mainly after the blows received from the French and
Dutch referenda.58
As Wasmeier explains,59 “the Constitution merges the
first and third pillars into a single legal framework. This
entails that there will no longer be different legal procedures
for the Community and the Union. The same legal
instruments (European laws and European framework
laws) and the co-decision procedure will apply to both
areas, and the infringement procedure will be extended to
criminal matters”.60
As a consequence of the unification of both pillars the
need for artificially splitting up instruments would be gone.
This is particularly acknowledged by Article III-271(2),
which foresees the approximation of criminal legislation in
a single European framework law if that proves essential for
ensuring the effective implementation of a harmonised
Union policy. In the light of this Article of the Constitutional
Treaty, it is difficult to understand the reluctance of the
Member States to assume the Community method.61
Regarding the legal nature, the instruments foreseen in
the Constitution, both Europeans laws and European
framework laws would have direct effect, being able,
therefore, to be invoked by individuals before national
courts.
Transparency of the decision-making system would also
be enhanced thanks to the new role that the Parliament
would play as co-legislator in the framework of the co-
decision procedure.
Last but not least, the Commission would be entitled to
initiate infringement procedures against those Member
States that do not transpose into their national legislation
Union legislation in the field of harmonisation of criminal
law. They could be brought before the European Court of
Justice, which would benefit from the general jurisdiction
that currently applies only in the framework of the first
pillar.
© European Community, 2005
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Conclusions
The judgement of the ECJ of 13 September 2005 expressly
gives the European Community, for the first time, the power
to impose on the Member
States the obligation to
provide for criminal
sanctions in the framework
of environmental policy, as
it is considered that crim-
inal penalties are neces-
sary in order to ensure its
effectiveness.
Furthermore, this judge-
ment will not only affect
Community environmental policy. As the Commission has
already expressed, in its Communication of 24 November
2005, the Community will have the power to approximate/
harmonise national criminal laws if it proves essential to
ensure the effectiveness of any other Community policy or
the proper functioning of a freedom (freedom of movement
of persons, goods, services or capital).
However, so long as the current pillar structure remains,
criminal law will only be considered as a means of
approximating national criminal laws in the framework of
the first pillar. Therefore, Title VI EU will still play a crucial
role in the field of harmonising the criminal laws of the
Member States in those areas that do not encroach upon
a Community policy.
The benefits from the new judgement can be qualified
as colossal with respect to the new legislative procedure
that will apply, the legal effects of the measures adopted
and the jurisdiction of the ECJ. The Community method will
apply in its entirety: the Commission will have the exclusive
right of initiative, the Parliament will participate in the
decision-making process as co-legislator; the directives
adopted will be able to entail direct effect; and the ECJ will
have full jurisdiction to control the Member States’ implemen-
tation of legal instruments and, eventually, to impose
penalty payments in cases
of non-compliance.
Those Member States
that are currently reluctant
to give power to the Com-
munity in the field of
harmonisation of criminal
laws will have to transpose
into their internal legislation
Community directives if
they have been supported
by a sufficient number of Member States – qualified
majority voting applies from now on. The Commission
could eventually decide to initiate an infringement procedure
against those Member States that do not comply with EC
legislation.
This judgement of the ECJ corroborates the changes
introduced by the Constitutional Treaty as foreseen in
Article III-271(2): European framework laws may
approximate national criminal laws if it proves essential to
ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy.
Furthermore, the suppression of the pillar structure of the
EU would avoid the need for artificially splitting up legal
instruments.
The judgement of 13 September 2005 sets, no doubt,
a crucial precedent and represents another important step
forward in the process towards the necessary commu-
nitarisation of the third pillar in order to accomplish a
monumental objective ... the establishment of a European
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. ::
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The application of the
Community method
is what most of the
Member States fear.
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NOTES
* The author would like to thank Professor Dr Edward Best for
his useful comments.
1 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council.
2 Council Framework Decision on the protection of the environ-
ment through criminal law [2003] OJ L 29/55. See also
Denmark’s initiative with a view to adopting a Council frame-
work Decision on combating serious environmental crime
[2000] C 39/4.
3 See, in particular, Articles 29, 31(e) and 34(2)(b) EU. The pillar
structure of the EU was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty,
which entered into force in November 1993. The third pillar
included the bulk of Justice and Home Affairs cooperation. The
Amsterdam Treaty transferred immigration, asylum and civil
cooperation to the first pillar (title IV EC); police and judicial
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